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Creationism as a Misconception:
Socio-cognitive conflict in the teaching
of evolution
Colin Foster∗
School of Education, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
This position paper argues that students’ understanding and acceptance of evolution may be
supported, rather than hindered, by classroom discussion of creationism. Parallels are drawn
between creationism and other scientific misconceptions, both of the scientific community in the
past and of students in the present. Science teachers frequently handle their students’
misconceptions as they arise by offering appropriate socio-cognitive conflict, which highlights
reasons to disbelieve one idea and to believe another. It is argued that this way of working, rather
than outlawing discussion, is more scientific and more honest. Scientific truth does not win the
day by attempting to deny its opponents a voice but by engaging them with evidence. Teachers
can be confident that evolution has nothing to fear from a free and frank discussion in which
claims can be rebutted with evidence. Such an approach is accessible to children of all ages and
is ultimately more likely to drive out pre-scientific superstitions. It also models the scientific
process more authentically and develops students’ ability to think critically.
Keywords: Creationism; Evolution; Socio-cognitive conflict; Misconceptions; Classroom
discussion
For a biologist, the alternative to thinking in evolutionary terms is not to think at all.
Peter Medawar
Introduction
Recent controversy over the teaching of creationism in UK secondary schools has
been bitter (Williams, 2008). The debate has been every bit as heated as that over
the truth or falsity of creationism, or so-called ‘intelligent design’, itself (Pennock,
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2003). Holliman and Allgaier (2006) and, more recently, Allgaier (2011) argue that
the media have played a significant role in influencing the course of public debate.
The resignation from the Royal Society in 2008 of Michael Reiss, professor of edu-
cation at the Institute of Education in London and a Church of England clergyman,
following a speech which was widely misinterpreted, highlights the sensitivity of the
issue (Baker, 2010). Although in his speech Reiss had described creationism as
having ‘no scientific basis’, his suggestion that it might be debated in science class-
rooms went too far for many of his peers (Sample, 2008). At the time of writing, a
group of 30 scientists, including David Attenborough and Richard Dawkins, ‘have
called on the government to toughen its guidance on the promotion of creationism
in classrooms, accusing “religious fundamentalists” of portraying it as scientific
theory in publicly funded schools’ (Butt, 2011).
While the scientific evidence for the theory of evolution is at least as compelling as
that for any other major widely-accepted scientific theory (such as the atomic theory,
for instance), it is still the case that many cling to creationist dogma (Berkman &
Plutzer, 2011; Bloom, 2009). In the USA, creationism is still tacitly believed by a
large proportion of students, including biology majors (Moore & Cotner, 2009),
and, despite claims to the contrary, it is far from being a uniquely American
phenomenon (Numbers, 2010), even among science teachers (Kim & Nehm,
2011). There are strong social pressures on young people to accept the perspective
promoted by parents and religious leaders in the community, and there is much
active distortion in various media aimed at supporting a creationist agenda
(Dawkins, 2007).
Although Reiss (2009) prefers to see it as a ‘worldview’, the predominant categor-
isation of creationism by scientists is as a misconception. For example, Alters and
Nelson (2002) describe ‘religious and myth-based misconceptions’ as:
concepts in religious and mythical teachings that, when transferred into science
education, become factually inaccurate. Two such misconceptions are that organisms
do not have common descent and that the Earth is too young for evolution (and most
geological processes) to have occurred. (p. 1895)
Nevertheless, calls for creationism not to be discussed in the classroom dis-
tinguish it from other scientific misconceptions which students may bring to their
science lessons (Gil-Perez & Carrascosa, 1990). It is as though creationism is just
too explosive to entertain. Yet in this position paper, I want to suggest that this
could be a mistake. Perhaps by attempting to censor creationism (Petress, 2005)
we risk inadvertently raising its status in students’ eyes and hindering its exposure
as a falsity, making it easier for opponents of evolution to portray themselves as
an attacked minority and the theory of evolution as some kind of conspiracy
(Moore, 2007, p. 26). If creationism cannot be talked about in science lessons, it
will be talked about elsewhere instead—the playground, the canteen, the religious
studies classroom, the home, the church—where it is unlikely to be challenged as
effectively as it might be by a scientist (Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000;
Moshman, 1985).
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Socio-Cognitive Conflict
One of the most well-established pedagogical techniques for dealing with scientific
misconceptions is the deliberate creation of socio-cognitive conflict (Perret-Clermont,
Carugati, & Oates, 2004). This occurs when a student’s way of thinking is confronted
by experiences (‘anomalous data’) that do not fit in with their current understanding
(Limo´n, 2001). The teacher’s intention in doing so is that students will react by
re-constructing their mental map, reconfiguring it to accommodate the new infor-
mation. However, challenges to deeply held long-standing beliefs may be experienced
as threatening and, when this is too significant, cognitive conflict can lead to entrench-
ment rather than belief change. Realistically, a single conversation or lesson is unlikely
to move a student from outright rejection of evolution to cheerful acceptance, and
stages such as uncertainty, peripheral belief change and belief decrease may be
regarded as educationally positive steps towards an eventual acceptance of the
theory (Kang, Scharmann, & Noh, 2004). von Glasersfeld (1995, p. 187) comments
with regard to physics teaching that ‘It is . . . rather naive to expect that one demon-
stration in class will induce students to give up a “misconception” which they have
found useful in their ordinary lives’ and compares this resistance to change with
that shown by the scientific community when cherished ideas have been challenged
by evidence. An initial conversation might merely sow some seeds of doubt leading
to later conceptual change (Cobern, 1994; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Sinatra, South-
erland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).
Cultivating in students a disposition to think critically is a vital part of a science
education (Driver et al., 2000). As Siegel (1989, p. 25) comments, ‘In order to be
a critical thinker, a person must have . . . certain attitudes, dispositions, habits of
mind, and character traits, which together may be labelled the “critical attitude”
or “critical spirit”’. However, although Pennock (2002, p. 28) concedes that
‘there is some merit in the idea of considering the creation/evolution controversy
as a case study to develop critical thinking’, suggesting that at university level this
could be practicable, he argues that at high school too much knowledge is required:
‘It takes a semester-long college course just to give undergraduates an introduction
to evolutionary theory, and one needs at least that much background to be able to
begin to judge the evidence for oneself ’ (p. 28). If this is correct, it is problematic,
since we are therefore expecting students to accept evolutionary theory without pos-
sessing sufficient knowledge to see the inadequacies of creationism—thus taking on
trust from their science teachers that evolution is correct. I once heard a strident
atheist student say that it was ludicrous to believe that the earth was only 6,000
years old when science had shown conclusively that it was in fact 6 million years
old. He was closer by a factor of 1,000 but still almost 1,000 times out, suggesting
that he had perhaps merely exchanged one mantra for another, with limited real
scientific understanding. We cannot regard young people as scientifically literate
merely because they know some important scientific facts—they need to be able
to make evidence-based scientific judgments for themselves (DeBoer, 2000;
Oulton, Dillon, & Grace, 2004).
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The common advice in creative writing to ‘show not tell’ is equally applicable to
science demonstrations; thinking adults are more readily persuaded of a conclusion
when they see it themselves rather than when it is foisted on them (O’Brien, 1991).
Students should dismiss creationism because they see that it is absurd, not because
they are told that it is, and it is not necessary to study biology at a highly advanced
level in order to do this. Dawkins (2010) most ably presents evidence that can be
understood by anyone of any age who takes the trouble to examine it. If there is
not time in school science lessons for scientific evidence of the kind he presents,
then something is very wrong pedagogically. It does not take a PhD in biology to
see the problems with creationism and that there is overwhelming evidence that the
earth is nearly a million times older than creationists claim. This can be understood
by young children. In a similar manner, several authors have found highly effective
ways of debunking pseudoscience for a lay audience, and there may be much that
science teachers can learn from the techniques of popular science writing and broad-
casting (Goldacre, 2008; Singh, 2008). If science students merely accumulate correct
facts without participating in the process of concluding that they are correct, they are
likely to acquire a warped perspective on what science is all about (Sandoval, 2005).
As Spencer (1910) comments:
To tell a child this and to show it the other, is not to teach it how to observe, but to make it a
mere recipient of another’s observations: a proceeding which weakens rather than
strengthens its powers of self-instruction—which deprives it of the pleasures resulting
from successful activity. (p. 102)
Teaching about the errors of creationism can help students to understand the char-
acter of scientific inquiry better, both in and beyond the context of evolution (Pond &
Pond, 2010). It might be thought that students are too young to make complex judg-
ments for themselves, but this overlooks the fact that they are inevitably doing so con-
stantly, both in and out of school (King & Kitchener, 2004). It is the science teacher’s
role to encourage development of this vital skill (Oulton et al., 2004). To expect stu-
dents to suspend their critical faculties in school and become passive recipients of gen-
erally accepted wisdom would be the very antithesis of science.
It might be felt that answering students’ questions is one thing but planning to
discuss creationism is deliberately introducing a misconception into the classroom
and wasting valuable time on falsity. On the contrary, I would argue that the
process of distinguishing truth from error is the whole business of science, and to
spend classroom time on doing so is exactly what science education should be
about. Such a journey involves examining numerous pieces of evidence, all of
which are factual, and considering how they can be best explained. This is not to
elevate creationism to the status of an alternative competing theory—there is no com-
petition; categorising it as a misconception is more appropriate—but the facts that
support the theory of evolution simultaneously expose the errors of creationism. It
is not unusual for a science teacher to choose to deliberately introduce false ideas
in other scientific topics. Some examples of ‘discarded science’ would be the idea of
phlogiston in combustion, of the luminiferous ether in the transmission of
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electromagnetic waves and of the flat earth in earth sciences (Grant, 2006). A science
teacher might even choose to adopt a devil’s advocate stance, placing students in the
role of combating the teacher’s points:
When you burn a candle, it weighs less afterwards, not more, doesn’t it?
How can a wave travel through ‘nothing’? What would be doing the ‘waving’?
If the earth were a ball, the people on the bottom would fall off, wouldn’t they?
Most science teachers will have been confronted by students who have encountered
conspiracy theories on the internet, such as the idea that the moon landings were fake,
and may be skilled at turning such conversations to educational advantage (Bowdley,
2003). Science teachers frequently see part of their role as debunking pseudoscience,
and might, for instance, discuss the dilution difficulties of homeopathy in connection
with Avogadro’s number (Martin, 1994) or the absurdities of astrology in connection
with astronomy. In all of these cases, real scientific learning is produced through inter-
action with false ideas.
It might be objected that science teachers do not have the expertise to address reli-
gious views in the classroom, yet in the history of science it has always been necessary
for scientists to challenge superstition and false ‘common sense’ arguments. When
teaching Newton’s laws of motion, for example, it could be seen as a missed opportu-
nity not to contrast these with popular ‘impetus’ and Aristotelian notions of ‘force’,
and it is not necessary to be a scholar of Greek philosophy to do so (Gilbert & Zyl-
bersztajn, 1985; Nersessian, 1989). (Important links might also be made to theories
that were yet to be established, such as special relativity and quantum mechanics.)
Scientific observations and theories inevitably stand in opposition to alternatives,
and it is reasonable to expect science teachers to locate them in such contexts. Con-
fronting clashing ideas is not unique to science teaching, and science teachers may
benefit from some of the ‘softer’ approaches used by teachers in other disciplines.
Ross (2007), writing with a completely different curriculum area in mind, comments:
The teacher needs to engage in discussion: to be provocative, to be a chair who permits
dissent, who puts forward views . . . listening to others, putting forward evidence and
arguments, allowing people to differ, picking up and elaborating points of similarity
and difference. This includes putting cases that challenge the children’s views—if necess-
ary making it clear that they are not your views—in a way that allows the class to respond,
to rebut, and to challenge them. (p. 125)
Modern-day scientific controversies, such as those over the nature of dark matter or
the role of string theory or the nature of consciousness, can also be naturally engaging
for students if handled skilfully (Oulton et al., 2004). Although there is no controversy
among knowledgeable scientists over the truth of the theory of evolution today, there
was a time when an honest scientist could be unsure. Likewise, even up to the late
nineteenth century, a scientist could argue against the atomic theory (Brock &
Knight, 1965). Such historical scientific disputes can be a natural way of coming to
see how the scientific community has embraced something which initially may have
seemed unlikely or counterintuitive, and the historical process of accumulating and
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connecting evidence may even mirror students’ individual experiences of developing
their scientific understanding (Wandersee, 1986).
Conclusion
It is just as important in science to teach the negatives as it is to teach the positives:
students need to know what is not true as well as what is. (On a mundane level, pre-
paring students for good-quality distractors in multiple-choice science assessments
highlights the necessity of this [Haladyna, Downing, & Rodriguez, 2002].) It is
naı¨ve to suppose that what is not mentioned in science lessons will be assumed to
be false. To be in favour of discussing creationism in science lessons is not to be in
favour of promoting it; on the contrary, creationism’s demise will inevitably follow
from its careful examination. Should the Holocaust ‘be taught’ in history lessons?
Should eugenics ‘be taught’ in biology? To teach about these topics does not imply
that they are good or correct (Brown & Davies, 1998). Many of the debates concerning
whether creationism should ‘be taught’ implicitly invoke a transmission model of
teaching, in which the teacher is passing on facts to the students, who are accepting
them on trust. Thus, to ‘teach’ something is to imply that it is true or valid. By con-
trast, a constructivist paradigm (Cobb, 1994) might be envisaged as placing the
responsibility on students to make sense of the evidence and judge for themselves
what makes scientific sense. From this perspective, creationism as a case study can
be seen as an opportunity for learning real science.
For a student to believe in evolution because they have been told by their teacher that
it is true is not much better than believing in creationism because they have been told by
their pastor that it is true. Although evolution happens to be right, the belief of such stu-
dents is simply an acquiescence to authority, little different in character from a religious
belief. Although they know a true fact, they know it for the wrong reason. As Russell
(2006, p. 74) writes of the Greek philosophers, ‘By good luck, the atomists hit on a
hypothesis for which, more than two thousand years later, some evidence was found,
but their belief, in their day, was none the less destitute of any solid foundation’.
Duschl and Osborne (2002) argue that students should be given:
the opportunity to consider plural theoretical accounts and the opportunity to construct
and evaluate arguments relating ideas and their evidence . . . Not to do so will leave the
student reliant on the authority of the teacher as the epistemic basis of belief leaving
the dependence on evidence and argument—a central feature of science—veiled from
inspection. (pp. 52–53)
Believing in the right thing for the wrong reasons is not a minor problem: students
who do take evolution ‘on trust’ might be presumed to be more vulnerable to being
talked out of it at some future point than those who feel the weight of evidence for
themselves. Science students should be discouraged from believing anything which
they have not been honestly persuaded of, by evidence and argument (hence The
Royal Society motto ‘On the word of no one’). Otherwise, we may appear to win the
evolution issue in our classroom today but leave students vulnerable to more
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charismatic individuals that they may meet in the future, who may undermine all our
good work. With regard to misconceptions generally, von Glasersfeld (1995, p. 187)
points out that ‘Telling [students] that they have to change their ideas because they are
not “true”, may create obedient lip service but does not generate understanding’. A
disinclination to believe anybody’s theory, even ours, unless it is supported by convin-
cing evidence, is a much better legacy to leave students with, and will ultimately direct
them towards the truth in all areas, not just evolution.
Research
A number of research questions remain, which can be settled only by empirical evi-
dence from the classroom:
(1) Does frank and free evidence-based discussion of creationism in the classroom
incline students towards evolution or simply entrench creationist ideas? What
skills does the teacher need to use in order to help students to benefit scientifically
from such discussions?
(2) How much background knowledge of biology is necessary for students to engage
meaningfully in such debates? Can this approach be effective in high school or not
until university level?
(3) Does discussion of creationism in the classroom assist in undermining creationist
‘conspiracy theory’ viewpoints, as compared with classrooms where it is a ‘no-go’
area, or does it merely lend it an unwarranted status in students’ eyes?
(4) How might the teaching styles used in the classroom affect the robustness of stu-
dents’ resulting beliefs? For instance, are students who, through discussion, have
come to their own conclusions in favour of evolution less easily talked out of it by
friends, family or religious leaders than those who have simply taken evolution on
trust from their teachers? It would be interesting to see how easy or difficult it is to
talk good science students out of their belief in a less controversial area (e.g.
atomic theory) and to probe how this might relate to the teaching methods used.
(5) In what ways can teachers support students who are convinced by the scientific evi-
dence for evolution but afraid to admit so? How might students be helped pasto-
rally to deal, for instance, with being ostracised for taking a scientific position on
this issue? Would students be more inclined to go with the evidence if they could
see that the social consequences of their changing sides could be ameliorated?
(6) How might the answers to all of these questions depend on students’ prior beliefs
and the social-cultural context of the school? Unlike many other scientific mis-
conceptions, creationism is being vigorously promoted from many directions,
so the degree and kind of background exposure is likely to be highly significant.
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